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Abstract 
This paper is based on a study by the same authors recently published by the European Commission. It provides an economic 
assessment of the impact of current VAT regimes on passenger transport in the EU, and the likely effects of alternative regimes. 
After a review of the features of the passenger transport industry as they relate to VAT, the paper identifies and assesses 
a number of distortions arising from unequal VAT treatment of operators or passengers. Using a series of transport-related 
econometric models it then evaluates a number of changes in the VAT regime that could address those distortions. 
The main conclusion is that the distortions introduced by the rather byzantine current VAT system are small- or medium-sized. 
For the distortions on output (passenger demand), a large part of the explanation of their small impact is in the low ‘pass through’ 
of changes in costs to changes in fares, and the low system-wide elasticities of demand; for input distortions, the main 
explanation is in the ability of operators to reclaim VAT incurred on inputs, so the only cost distortion is that some operators 
incur additional financing costs between when VAT is paid and when it is rebated. These costs are small because of the short 
time between payment and reimbursement and the current low interest rates on that financing. 
The paper identifies one set of measures that addresses output distortions deriving from different VAT rates and place of supply 
rules and another addresses input distortions.  
The paper also provides valuable insights for tax administrations. It reveals an enormous potential of the application of VAT in 
the passenger transport sector with regard to generating revenue, and the small impact of applying simpler VAT rates. 
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We can conclude that a simplified and harmonised application of VAT on all passenger modes, markets and all member states 
(aimed at elimination or reducing the distortions of the current VAT regime) would have only a small impact on both operators 
and passengers. 
© 2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Road and Bridge Research Institute (IBDiM). 
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1. Introduction 
In December 2011 the European Commission set out the features of a future VAT system, one of the key 
priorities of which was that it should be more efficient than the current system. In respect of passenger transport 
services, the current system, with its many exemptions and special rates, has resulted in the application of 
a multiplicity of different rates by transport mode, transport market and Member State. The VAT regime for 
passenger transport has long been believed to result in many competitive distortions. This paper provides the results 
of an economic assessment of the impact of the current VAT regimes and the likely effects of alternative VAT 
regimes undertaken to help inform the policy makers dealing with VAT distortions. 
2. Methods 
This paper contributes to the debate by providing a summary of the current state of the passenger transport 
market, both its demand and supply, a review of the current VAT regime, an assessment of the impact of many of 
the perceived distortions and an evaluation of some of the alternative VAT structures on which a future VAT regime 
for the transport sector might be based. 
2.1. The current state of the EU market for passenger transport services 
The review of passenger demand and supply, so far as they relate to VAT was tackled in two parts. Transport 
demand was covered by a large scale review of passenger transport for the year 2010, based on the output of the FP7 
project ETISplus and the European transport model TREMOVE. The output of this part was a detailed dataset of 
transport demand (expressed in passenger-kilometres (PKM) and number of passenger trips), split by transport 
mode, geographic location (using NUTS21 zone) and travel purpose (relevant because of VAT deductibility rules for 
business travel). Passenger demand was distinguished for four markets (urban, domestic non-urban, cross-border 
intra-EU and cross-border extra-EU transport) as many Member States have different VAT rates for each of them 
and they are regulated by different authorities. For the supply side, the assessment revolved around three key 
indicators: number of vehicles, number of seats and number of seat kilometres, for each of the transport modes and 
markets identified in the first phase. Data sources included Eurostat and national statistics, TREMOVE and 
dedicated publications from transport service operators or representative organizations (e.g. the UITP2). The 
competitiveness of each market was analysed for those countries with sufficient data availability using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
2.2. The current VAT regime for passenger transport services 
The second data set that needed to be collected was that relating to the current VAT regimes for passenger 
transport services at the national level and for each of the markets, taking account of any and all exceptions. 
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Generally, three levels of VAT are applied to outputs: a standard rate, a reduced rate and a zero rate. Most inputs are 
VAT rated at the standard rate or zero. Data sources included the websites of the national Ministries of Finance, 
documents of the European Commission, the national VAT Acts and tax legislation, country reports of the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), and other studies on VAT regimes. Where necessary, data 
from these sources was supplemented by that from commercial guides to the application of VAT, manuals, and 
application decrees provided by the respective fiscal authorities. 
2.3. Definition and analysis of competitive distortions 
Rarely have discussions of VAT distortions been based on a description of the actual situation. For the analyses 
a distortion was defined as the outcome of unequal treatment of passengers and/or operators with respect to any of 
the parameters composing the VAT regime in force in Member States in the passenger transport sector, and which 
leads to economic, social, and/or environmental changes in behaviour. 
In practice, distortions were measured where a different VAT rate is applied to the inputs or outputs of one mode 
compared to the others. A set of 15 distortions, split into 4 groups was assessed for its impact on demand and 
supply. A combination of policy options, combined into 11 scenarios was devised to address the distortions. The 
extent to which they could do this, and the other impact they would have, was analysed using three models: two 
transport models representing different levels of aggregation (TREMOVE and a City Pairs Model (CPM)) and 
a socio-economic General Equilibrium Model (EDIP). 
x TREMOVE is a policy assessment model to study the effects of different transport and environment policies on 
the emissions of the transport sector. The model calculates changes in demand relative to a given baseline (i.e. the 
Transport White Paper reference scenario) as a result of a change in relative costs (VAT) of different transport 
options, using a methodology based on a nested CES (constant elasticities of substitution) tree. As the relative 
usage costs and prices of two options change because of VAT policy (e.g. a plane and a train ticket), their relative 
demand changes as well. Baseline data came from the European Commission’s Transport Reference Scenario as 
described in the 2011 Transport White Paper Impact Assessment, which in turn is based on Eurostat for historic 
data of transport volumes, and other EC supported models. Relevant outputs were changes in PKM, vehicle 
kilometres, vehicle stock, emissions, and VAT and fare revenue (in part). These outputs were split by country, 
mode, trip distance class, and trip motive. Together, they provided a good indication of the effect of the potential 
policy changes investigated in this paper’s underlying study. 
x The CPM provided practical illustrations of how alternative VAT reform scenarios will change the VAT rates 
that passengers will be faced with and to gain insight into how these changes might influence passenger 
behaviour at the level of single city pairs. It also provided indications of how operator revenue could change for 
the selected routes under different VAT reform scenarios. 
x The EDIP model, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, describes the interactions between numerous 
economic agents (households, firms, government, and the rest of the world) in different markets (goods and 
services (G&S), capital, and labour). Households supply labour and capital to firms that organize production 
activities. In return, households receive payments for the use of labour and capital factors in the form of wages 
and capital income (e.g. interest or dividends). Furthermore, households spend income on G&S, which are 
delivered by firms. The government is involved in transfers to and from households and firms. The transfers may 
refer to taxes on G&S, production, subsidies, income taxes, social security contributions, and social benefits. 
There is also an interaction with the rest of the world. Relevant outputs were changes in price and expenditures 
for different transport modes, changes in VAT and fare revenue (in part) and GDP, as well as on emissions and 
employment. 
Results on transport volumes are generated primarily with the TREMOVE model, with the CPM as a support tool 
to investigate specific connections. EDIP uses TREMOVE transport volumes as input to calculate evolutions in 
macroeconomic indicators. 
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2.4. Scenario analysis 
Eleven indicative VAT scenarios were used to help assess the impacts of possible ways to address the distortions. 
The scenarios were designed to assess the practical feasibility of their implementation and how they might influence 
the three main players in passenger transport: the users, the operators, and the Member States as well as some of 
their macro-economic and social impacts. The scenarios are described in more detail in section 3.4. 
3. Results 
3.1. The current state of the EU market for passenger transport services 
The demand for and supply of passenger transport services were considered in terms of four markets: urban, 
other domestic, intra-EU (between Member States), and extra-EU (between Member States and non-EU countries).  
The first two markets dominated, accounting in 2010 for more than 99% of total passengers, of which about two-
-thirds (63.1%) were urban and 36.0% other domestic. Intra-EU passengers accounted for only 0.7% of the total and 
extra-EU passengers for only 0.2%. However, because of different trip lengths, urban passengers accounted for only 
24% of PKM, other domestic passengers for 41%, intra-EU for 15%, and extra-EU for 20%. 
x Within the urban market, metro passengers accounted for about 46% of passengers, but only 24% of PKM, bus 
passengers for 41% of passengers and 38% of PKM, while rail accounted for only 13% of passengers, but 35% of 
PKM; 
x Air transport represented a small share of domestic passengers (0.5%), but a much larger share of PKM (7.1%); 
the largest share of intra-EU passengers (72%) and an even larger share (87.2%) of PKM, and; a dominant share 
of both extra-EU passengers (91.5%) and PKM (98.6%) The average domestic trip length was just over 30km;  
x Bus transport had by far the largest share of domestic passengers (81%), but a smaller share of domestic PKM 
(59.4%); however, it had the smallest mode share of intra-EU passengers (8%) and PKM (4.1%), as well as 
extra-EU passengers (3.6%) and PKM (0.6%);  
x Rail had the second largest share of domestic passengers (15%) and PKM (33.5%), as well as of intra-EU 
passengers (20%) and PKM (8.8%). It had a slightly higher share of extra-EU passengers than bus (5%), but 
about the same small share of PKM (0.7%). 
These market and mode shares are important in assessing the overall significance of the market distortions 
attributable to differences in VAT rates. Although the intra-EU and extra-EU markets attract more attention in terms 
of these distortions, since they account for less than 1% of all passengers, their overall impact on competitive 
distortions is small. The difference in market shares of PKM shows that the two international markets (intra-EU and 
extra-EU), which together account for 35% of the total, will be more important in assessing the impacts of any 
market distortions on VAT revenues.  
3.2. The current VAT regime for passenger transport services 
Currently the taxation of passenger transport services depends on the VAT rates of the Member States where the 
transport takes place. Consequently, for cross-border trips, the VAT rules of several Member States might apply. In 
this case, the allocation is made in proportion to the distances covered in each Member State.  
For each mode of transport (road, rail, inland waterways, maritime shipping, and air), we distinguish between 
domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU transport. In the case of domestic transport, a further distinction is made between 
non-urban and urban transport, the latter having a different set of public transport modes – bus/BRT, taxi, tram, 
metro/LRT).  
While standard VAT rates in Member States range from 15% to 27%, passenger transport services are frequently 
taxed at lower rates, or even zero-rated or exempt from VAT.  
For domestic passenger transport, six Member States apply their standard rate to all passenger transport and 
twelve Member States apply reduced rates with some exemptions. Only one Member State taxes all domestic 
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passenger transport at a super-reduced rate of 3%; two Member States exempt most domestic passenger transport 
services from VAT and in one Member State nearly all scheduled services are zero-rated. The remaining six 
Member States use different criteria to distinguish between various types of domestic services, which are also 
subject to different VAT rates.  
Currently there are no differences with respect to VAT rates between intra-EU and extra-EU passenger transport 
services, as they are treated as international transport, but there are important differences between modes and 
Member States. While all 28 Member States zero-rate international passenger transport by sea and air, other modes 
are frequently subject to positive rates. International passenger transport by road is taxed in 10 Member States and 
international passenger transport services by rail are subject to a positive VAT rate in 7 Member States. Most of 
these countries apply a reduced rate, with the exception of three of them where one or more modes of international 
passenger transport are taxed at the standard rate. 
For business travel, VAT incurred on passenger transport services is deductible in all but three Member States, 
while some apply restrictions in certain cases. 
As well as the varied VAT taxation of the passenger service themselves, the inputs to providing those services, 
such as the vehicles, fuel and maintenance materials, are also subject to different VAT rates. Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive provides exemptions from VAT for most inputs to sea and air services, which are valid, with only minor 
implementation-specific differences, in all Member States. The same inputs to other modes are, as a general rule, 
taxed at the standard rate, with VAT deductibility allowed for the buyer. While international air passenger services 
benefit from zero rating for outputs and exemptions on inputs, they are subject to some user charges not applied to 
other modes. Air passenger taxes of one type or another are currently applied in five Member States. 
3.3. Competitive distortions resulting from the current VAT regime 
There are four groups of distortions deriving from the current VAT regime, those resulting from different: 
1. VAT rates between modes of transport, markets, and Member States; 
2. Member States in the way they define passenger transport services and their associated inputs;  
3. Treatments by Member States of inputs to passenger transport services by different modes in different 
markets; and 
4. VAT rates and regulations regarding the place of supply of transport services and their inputs. 
In this section, we discuss all distortions individually, and makes an estimate of the magnitude of the disruption, 
in terms of transport demand or EUR. 
3.3.1. Different VAT rates between transport services provided in different modes, markets, and Member States 
3.3.1.1. Within one mode at the domestic level 
Twelve Member States have some form of this distortion, though only in one of them could it possibly cause an 
actual competitive distortion. It can apply to a specific mode (e.g. short distance buses and taxis might have 
a different rate than those used on longer distance routes), vehicle size (services by vehicles below a threshold size 
might be liable to lower VAT rates than those using larger vehicles), or scheduled versus unscheduled services (in 
some Member States the former are VAT rated lower than the latter). Overall, this distortion has a very small 
impact, since only a small proportion of passenger trips are provided by the differently rated vehicles or services. 
3.3.1.2. Between modes at the domestic level 
This distortion is not very common. Examples include one Member State where domestic air travel is taxed at 
21% compared to other modes at 6%); another where maritime services are zero rated compared to other modes at 
6%); and yet another where air, inland waterways, maritime, road are all VAT rated differently). The modes that are 
differently VAT rated to the other modes usually account for a small share of domestic trips so the overall distortive 
impact is very small. 
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3.3.1.3. Within one mode of transport between domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU transport 
This distortion is one of the most widespread, and, for some Member States, the differences between domestic 
and intra-EU VAT rates are quite high. All but three Member States apply a lower VAT rate to at least one mode of 
international transport than they do for the same mode in domestic transport.  
Fourteen Member States zero-rate all international services irrespective of mode of transport; while at the same 
time applying a positive VAT rate to all modes of domestic transport; one Member State has a different rate for four 
modes; four Member States for three modes (sea and inland navigation are included as different modes, although 
they are not differentiated in the passenger statistics); five Member States for two modes, and; two Member States 
for one mode. The practical impact of the distortion is less than its potential, as there is only limited competition 
between the markets that could be influenced by transport fares. 
Most cross-border intra and extra EU travel is by air, so despite the low elasticity of market choice with respect to 
fare, the impact of this distortion could be large given the large differences between VAT rates in these two markets 
compared to domestic markets for some Member States. For the other modes the impact is small, given the same 
low fare elasticities, their small international market shares, and the relatively small differences between their VAT 
rates in different markets.  
3.3.1.4. Between different modes of transport for intra-EU and extra-EU travel 
Whereas all Member States zero-rate intra-EU and extra-EU air and maritime passenger transport, 10 Member 
States apply positive tax rates to extra-EU road passenger transport, 7 to rail transport, and 6 to inland navigation. 
The gap between the rates applied to the different modes of intra-EU and extra-EU passenger transport within the 
same Member State ranges from 5 to 25 percentage points. 
The extent of the distortion was quantified in terms of numbers of passengers and revenue to operators, but the 
extent of the distortion depends on what it is compared to. We compared the current VAT rates with a situation in 
which all modes would be zero-rated, since 80% of the Member States and mode combinations in the two 
international markets are zero-rated.  
The impact of this distortion was considered to be of medium impact. There would be a loss of some 0.5 billion 
PKM for these two modes, less than 1% of the total, but a rather greater percentage of loss of operator revenue of 
between 2% and 3%, and greater still for operators specializing in international passenger transport. These losses 
were measured using the 2013 passenger numbers and mode shares, but as high speed rail (HSR) and international 
bus services expand to compete more with air services, the distortions might now be expected to be slightly greater. 
3.3.1.5.  Different delimitation between domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU (two-sector trips) 
This distortion results from eight Member States applying the domestic VAT rate to the domestic part of an 
international passenger trip. Even where the domestic section of an international trip can be identified, the addition 
of the national VAT to the fare has only a small impact on competitiveness. For a typical cross-border intra-EU trip 
(average trip length of 1,540km for the sample in the CPM, of which 300km are in the origin Member State, and an 
average fare of EUR 0.15/km including an average VAT rate of 12%), the fare increases by about 2.4%, which 
results in a reduction in the number of trips by 0.8%, as compared to a no-VAT case. Nevertheless, the number of 
multi-sector trips where the first section is domestic is a small proportion of the total, even for the Member States 
for which this distortion is applicable. We thus assessed the extent of the distortion as small for the Member States 
involved and very small for the EU as a whole. 
3.3.1.6.  Lower VAT rates applied in certain regions 
Two Member States apply a lower VAT rate for passenger travel within, or to and from, some of their less 
developed regions. The fare reduction through the application of a lower VAT rate as a percentage of the total cost 
of a tourist trip to the affected regions is less than 1%.  
3.3.2. Different definition of passenger transport services and their input between Member States 
Most Member States have a clear directive in their legislation regarding which passenger services are subject to 
VAT. Other Member States are less clear, particularly with respect to vehicles that are not used exclusively for 
passenger transport. For example, some exclude rental cars without a driver, while others apply a lower limit on 
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vehicle size. The extent of this distortion is small, as the majority of passenger travel falls clearly within or outside 
Member State VAT regulations. Consumption on board of ships, aircraft, or trains was not included as a distortion 
in the assessment. 
3.3.3. Different treatments by Member States of inputs in the passenger transport services by different modes in 
different markets 
3.3.3.1.  Exemptions following Article 148 of VAT Directive – delay in processing VAT refunds 
Article 148 of the VAT Directive provides the framework for the zero-rating of supplies for maritime and 
international aviation, but not to the same supplies for international bus and rail services. The impact on operators’ 
costs is not as great as might first appear. While these two modes do not have to pay VAT on their qualifying inputs, 
operators in the competing modes of rail and bus transport can reclaim such VAT. Their additional costs derive only 
from the financing costs of VAT for the period between when the payments are made and the reimbursements are 
received. 
The impact of this distortion was measured as the total avoided cost of financing the VAT liability maritime and 
air passenger operators would have incurred if Article 148 were not operational. The combination of the ability of 
operators to recover VAT on inputs when the outputs are positively rated, the relatively short periods within which 
input VAT is now reimbursed by most Member States, and the current low interest rates that apply to funding the 
VAT during this period, result in a small overall cost impact of this distortion (EUR 121 million for the EU28). 
3.3.3.2. Specification of vehicle use for passenger transport for purposes of input VAT 
All Member States allow for the deduction of input VAT on vehicles used for the provision of commercial 
passenger transport services (except for cases where passenger transport services are exempt). A few Member States 
apply restrictions, though, mainly in connection with private cars that are used for passenger services. The effect of 
these restrictions is most likely not relevant for competition, as they address the possibility of abuse of deductions. 
We evaluated it as not relevant for purposes of this study. 
3.3.3.3. Tax incentives for fuel and electricity  
To encourage the use of public transport, in selected transport modes and in certain Member States, there are 
lower VAT rates on fuel used for passenger transport and reduced tax and duty rates for other inputs. While possibly 
helping to achieve this objective, these lower rates can introduce distortions. Energy is about 10% to 12% of train 
operating costs, up to 20% for bus operations, and about 30% for air passenger operations. However, all VAT 
expenditures on fuel used as an input to passenger transport operations can be reclaimed (other than in the Member 
States where services are exempt from VAT without the right to reclaim). 
As with VAT on other inputs to passenger transport operations, those for energy are refundable, so the only cost 
distortion is that of financing the difference in energy cost from those operators who do not benefit from the 
distortion. Even when the refund period is long, the financial cost is a small percentage of total operator cost. The 
overall impact of this distortion is very small.  
3.3.4. Different VAT rates and regulations regarding the place of supply of transport services and their inputs 
3.3.4.1.  Place of VAT liability: complexity of calculating place of supply (distance) of extra-EU and intra-EU rail 
and road transport 
The place of VAT liability has attracted much attention for the high administrative costs that it is believed to 
impose on transport operators for its collection and distribution to the various Member States through which trips 
pass. 
Measuring VAT according to distance obliges companies in the bus and railway passenger transport sector to 
determine VAT for each trip separately. The determination is particularly difficult when the actual trip has different 
distances to those anticipated when the ticket was purchased. Whereas the use of informatics tools allows for such 
calculations, they do involve start-up and maintenance costs. The costs are a handicap for small operators that 
cannot so easily make use of professional software tools.  
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The correct calculation of the distances passengers travel in each country is particularly important for small 
Member States whose passenger VAT revenue is largely earned from transit passengers. This proportion of this 
revenue is higher for Member States located closer to the geographic centre of the EU. 
3.3.4.2. Additional compliance costs 
Although there are four different distortions in this group, they were assessed together as no data was found for 
the individual distortions. Supplying passenger transport services in certain Member States necessitates higher 
administrative costs than in others.  
Coping with these differences is particularly onerous for small operators. Based on the data for the only Member 
State where compliance by company size was found, compliance costs for small and large companies is about the 
same, but several times higher than that for medium-sized companies. From three other Member States, it was found 
that compliance costs are higher when there are more VAT rates to be dealt with. Overall, the impact of this 
distortion is small, but it does result in some discrimination against small transport operators. 
3.3.4.3. Different treatment of sections in or above international areas outside the EU 
Each Member State has its own regulations for determining the VAT liability for passenger transport that takes 
place in international water or airspace when it forms part of a domestic trip. Distortions also derive from the 
different ways of differentiating between domestic and international trips and from measuring the domestic part of 
the distance when VAT is applied to that part of an international trip. A variation of this distortion is where domestic 
passengers might extend their trip a short distance to an international destination and then make a return 
international trip to their real destination. There are very few instances of this being feasible. Although there are 
anecdotal instances of each variation of this distortion occurring in practice, when taken together, they account for 
a very small proportion of total trips, PKM and VAT revenue. 
3.3.4.4. Difficulty in determining place of supply (distance) of extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea transport 
This distortion is different to the others in that it does not yet occur and would only occur if air or maritime 
international passenger transport were to be subject to VAT. If this were to be implemented, it could be difficult to 
determine what distance had been travelled in the territorial water or air space of transited Member States and what 
VAT liabilities would be incurred. Rail and, to a lesser extent, road transport is constrained in its distances and 
routes by the fixed infrastructure that it uses, which subsequently limits the complexity of calculating the distances 
travelled in each Member State. Sea and air transport are less constrained in this sense. 
However, technology has greatly simplified such calculations and software used by airlines to assess their 
liability to Eurocontrol charges could easily be adapted to assess VAT liabilities. Similar software is available to 
ferry and cruise line operators. This is, therefore, unlikely to be an important distortion should it ever occur. 
However, small operators might incur proportionally higher administration costs than large operators, particularly in 
dealing with trips that end up taking different routes to those expected when the passenger ticket was purchased and 
VAT liability first estimated.  
3.4. Scenario analysis 
Eleven indicative VAT scenarios were used to help assess the impacts of possible ways to address the distortions. 
None of these scenarios addressed all distortions; hence, no scenario could be considered a candidate for an 
alternative VAT regime. The scenarios were designed to assess the practical feasibility of their implementation and 
how they might influence the three main players in passenger transport: the users, the operators, and the Member 
States as well as some of their macro-economic and social impacts. Some of the scenarios were amenable to 
quantification, while some could only be described quantitatively. 
x Scenario 1: Output VAT on all modes of passenger transport in the urban, other domestic, and intra-EU markets 
is set at national standard rates (differing per country). VAT rates on extra-EU passengers and on all inputs to the 
operation of passenger transport are unchanged. 
x Scenario 2: Similar to Scenario 1, but with the output VAT rates set to the reduced national rates.  
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x Scenario 3: The same as Scenario 1, but the place of taxation is changed from the Member State in which the 
transport service is provided to the Member State of passenger departure.  
x Scenario 4: The same as Scenario 2, with a change in place of taxation as in Scenario 3. 
x Scenario 5: Applies current VAT rates, but with the place of taxation as per Scenario 3. 
x Scenario 6: Applies current output VAT rates, but abolishes Article 148 of the VAT Directive exempting VAT 
on inputs to air and maritime intra-EU and extra-EU services.  
x Scenario 7: The same as Scenario 6, but instead of removing the exemptions of Article 148, it extends its 
provisions to inputs for bus and passenger rail services.  
x Scenario 8: Is similar to VAT Scenario 4, which applies national reduced VAT rates to passenger outputs, uses 
the Member State of passenger departure for where VAT liability is incurred, and extends that liability to the 
extra-EU passenger trips.  
x Scenario 9: is similar to VAT Scenario 8; however, the VAT liability for VAT on extra-EU passengers is based 
on the fare before user charges or taxes are added, with specific ticket taxes eliminated as they are replaced by 
VAT.  
x Scenario 10: Retains current input and output VAT rates, but implements the one-stop-shop provision for 
passenger transport VAT transactions. 
x Scenario 11: Applies current domestic VAT rates on inputs and outputs, but harmonizes the output VAT rates on 
intra-EU and extra-EU passengers to zero (or provides an exemption with the right to deduct). 
Since the scenarios were designed to eliminate one or several of the distortions, the simulations were 
a quantification (to the extent possible) of their potential success in this respect, and of some others of their major 
impacts Not all of the potential impacts will be in the form of costs. The simulations also assessed some of the 
benefits, for instance, reduced carbon and noxious emissions and increased VAT revenues (at least in some of the 
scenarios), which could in turn be used for other purposes by national governments.  
With this caveat, our modelling work showed that the scenario with the largest economic and environmental 
impact is Scenario 1, which is not surprising in view of the fact that it provides the largest shock to the existing 
system. Overall demand for transport would decline by between 0.7% and 4.8% by 2030 (for the EU28, with wide 
variations across Member States). VAT revenue from passenger transport would almost trebles as a result of the 
increase to national standard rates. However, transport operator revenue was found to decrease by 3% (short term, 
full pass through) up to 10% (long term, limited pass through) when compared to the reference scenario, where the 
current VAT rules are maintained. In addition, economy-wide effects on GDP would be minor because of the 
hypothesis that compensatory tax reductions or transfer increases cushion households from a negative fiscal shock. 
However, employment in the sector would decline, sometimes substantially, according to mode. 
Scenario 2 would have a much more moderate effect on all of the variables that have been discussed, since the 
increases in rates would be more limited and apply to fewer Member States and modes (i.e. many Member States 
already use reduced rates). 
Scenarios 3, 4, 5, and 8 provided information on the consequences of a change in the place of taxation. The main 
message here is that, if such change were to be desirable for policy purposes, its effects would be rather marginal 
and we presume easily handled with minor compensatory mechanisms. 
Scenarios 6 and 7 explored the consequences of removing or extending the provisions of Article 148 to all 
operators. Our conclusion is that the consequences are trivial.  
Scenario 9 showed that using VAT based on pre-tax fares and national reduced rates for all transport modes and 
on the Member State of departure would not have a significant impact (on fares, demand, and competitiveness 
between or within modes) compared to VAT based on final ticket prices. One further option would be to replace the 
already existing ticket taxes by VAT. 
Scenario 10 argued that the introduction of a single window for passenger transport VAT issues might be 
desirable, but it could not be evaluated without a specific study. We argued that such a scheme could be offered on 
a voluntary basis and then assessed on the basis of accumulated experience. 
Finally, Scenario 11, which is the closest to the principle of subsidiarity, in that it would only affect international 
travel, would have minimal consequences on relevant variables affecting the demand or supply of passenger 
transport. 
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4. Conclusion & discussion 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the distortions introduced by the rather byzantine VAT system are 
generally small- or medium-sized. For the distortions on output, part of the explanation is in the low elasticities of 
demand system-wide; while for input distortions, it is the ability of operators to reclaim any VAT incurred on inputs, 
so the only cost is that of financing these costs between when they are paid and when they are rebated. These costs 
are relatively small because of the reduced times between payment and reimbursement and the current low interest 
rates on that financing. 
x The main underlying assumptions of this paper considered the elasticity of transport demand and the amount of 
cost pass-through that transport operators can reasonably achieve. 
x Transport demand price elasticities were not explicitly assumed, but derived from the CES based demand 
modelling done with TREMOVE. The implied demand elasticities are rather low, in the range of -0.4 to -0.6 for 
the short term, and no more than twice these values for the long term. These elasticities refer to generalized price, 
including not just monetary cost but also time cost. The applied values are in line with other estimates (e.g. 
Litman (2013)), but on the lower end of the spectrum. Given the systemic, all-encompassing nature of the 
assessment of transport demand as a whole, where fewer alternatives are available, this is justifiable. 
x The cost pass-through (the part of an increase/decrease in tax that is passed on to the consumer) was determined 
from the competitiveness index and demand elasticity for each transport mode and country. A review of practical 
examples was used to set up a theoretical assessment method. Results suggest that pass-through is highest in rail 
(51%, EU28), where competition is weak and few alternatives exist. The lowest pass-through is found in the air 
transport (7%), particularly on shorter routes. One practical implication of a less-than-full pass-through is that 
demand from business travelers is expected to go up due to VAT deductibility. In some markets (particularly 
intra-EU air), the increased business demand is projected to outweigh the reduction in PKM from other travelers. 
We refer to Sobolewski et al. (2014) for more info on the underlying method. 
x The effects on other parties outside of users, operators and national authorities collecting VAT were not covered, 
as this was not within in the scope of the underlying study. Nonetheless, prior to implementation, the impact on 
(local) authorities providing subsidies to public transport operators, environmental and other externalities (e.g. 
with regard to modal split) should also be considered. 
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